Admission to Bar—Civil Disobedience Not Sufficient Grounds for Finding Lack of Good Moral Character—\u3ci\u3eHallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar\u3c/i\u3e, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966) by Fenton, William B.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 47 | Issue 1 Article 10
1968
Admission to Bar—Civil Disobedience Not
Sufficient Grounds for Finding Lack of Good
Moral Character—Hallinan v. Committee of Bar
Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76,
55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966)
William B. Fenton
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
William B. Fenton, Admission to Bar—Civil Disobedience Not Sufficient Grounds for Finding Lack of Good Moral Character—Hallinan v.
Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966), 47 Neb. L. Rev. 128 (1968)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol47/iss1/10
128 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 47, NO. 1 (1968)
Casente
ADMISSION TO BAR-CivnL DISOBEDIENCE NOT SUFFICIENT GROUNDS
FOR FINDING LACK OF GOOD MORAL CHARAcTER-Hallinan v. Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76,
55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
After successfully passing the California bar examination, the
petitioner was refused certification for admission by a committee
of bar examiners on grounds he did not possess the requisite good
moral character. The committee's decision was based primarily on
acts of civil disobedience committed by the petitioner and his state-
ments in defense thereof. He had been arrested six times while
taking part in civil rights demonstrations and "sit-ins" at private
business establishments in San Francisco and had twice been con-
victed as a result of these activities for such misdemeanors as
unlawful assembly, trespass and disturbing the peace.1 When
questioned by the committee, the peitioner defended direct acts
of civil disobedience to attempt to bring about changes in discrimi-
natory hiring practices and to help effect needed civil rights legis-
lation when traditional means of achieving these goals proved
useless.
Upon concluding an independent examination of the record the
California Supreme Court (with one dissent) held that the evidence
did not justify the committee's finding that the petitioner lacked
good moral character and it directed that he be certified for admis-
sion to the bar. The court found the decisive question regarding
the petitioner's good moral character to be "whether he has com-
mitted or is likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude. '2
Pointing out that the petitioner's civil rights activities had been
peaceful, the court ruled that the crimes for which he had been
convicted did not, considering all the circumstances, amount to acts
of moral turpitude.8
1 The petitioner had also been arrested while doing civil rights work
in Mississippi and he had been fined for "blocking a footpath" while
taking part in a peace demonstration in England.
2 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447,
453, 421 P.2d 76, 81, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1966).
3 Id. at 462, 421 P.2d at 87, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 239. The court also con-
sidered evidence on the record concerning nine fistfights which the
petitioner had been involved in. It found that he had adequately
explained three of these and concluded that the other six "can be
classified as youthful indiscretions." Id. at 464, 421 P.2d at 89, 55 Cal.
Rptr. at 241.
The bar examining committee had the history of the petitioner's
pugilistic exploits before it, but its decision as to his moral unworthi-
ness, and the court's subsequent reversal of this decision, seem to have
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The Hallinan case throws into bold relief the issue of whether
a person who deliberately violates laws as a matter of conscience
is the type of candidate who should be allowed admittance to the
ranks of a profession whose members have customarily professed
unswerving obedience to the law. An additional issue implied in
the case is whether a present member of the bar is duty-bound to
obey all written statutes and common law rules of behavior regard-
less of his belief that he is obeying a higher code by sometimes
breaking certain of these statutes and rules.
I. TRADITIONAL REASONS FOR FINDING ABSENCE OF
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Almost all of the states require, either by statute or court rule,
that an applicant for admission to the bar be of good moral char-
acter.4 However few of these statutes or court rules attempt to
define good moral character, this determination normally being
made in the first instance by a bar examining committee, with a
state court exercising a power of review over the committee's deci-
sion.5 Bar examining committees may be appointed by a court or
chosen by the state bar association.6
An applicant's conviction of a crime of violence7 or frauds has
commonly been cited by courts as adequate for upholding exclu-
sion decisions of bar examining committees. Considering these
crimes to involve "moral turpitude" (a term to be discussed infra)
courts have reasoned that members of the public should be pro-
been based primarily on the petitioner's arrests and convictions in
behalf of civil rights and his attitude that civil disobedience was some-
times justifiable. The court noted that a subcommittee of the bar
examining committee "had based its findings solely on petitioner's
beliefs and activities in connection with civil disobedience." Id. at
450, 421 P.2d at 79, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 231 n.2.
4 WEST PUBLISHING Co., RULES FOR ADMIsSION TO THE BAR (1963). See,
e.g., NES. REv. STAT. §§7-102, 7-109 (Reissue 1962); GA. COnE ANN.§ 9-103(a) (Supp. 1966).
Lawyers are not the only professional people who must meet the
good moral character standard. In Nebraska for example, the same
requirement must be met by such varied professionals as embalmers
and barbers. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 71-195(1), 71-204 (3) (Reissue 1966).
5 IND. ANN. STAT., R. Sup. & App. Cts., R. 3-13a (Supp. 1966).
6 IOWA COnE AwN. § 610.4 (1950); IDAHO COnE ANN. §§ 3-403, 3-408 (1947).
7 In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 167 A.2d 81 (1961) (assaulting and beating
wife); In re Meyerson, 190 Md. 671, 59 A.2d 489 (1948) (causing and
conspiring to cause an abortion).
s Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865
(1961) (mail fraud); In re Dillingham, 188 N.C. 162, 124 S.E. 130 (1924)
(obtaining goods by false pretense, larceny or conspiracy to commit
it, forgery and extortion).
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tected from the possibility of the person repeating his misdeed while
serving them as an attorney. Courts have also been concerned to
protect the legal profesion against the risk of losing esteem in the
eyes of the public through the recidivism of such a member. The
possibility of the applicant having reformed is rarely given much
weight.
Actual conviction of crime is not always a condition precedent
to a finding of bad moral character. A mere allegation of illegal
or dishonest behavior appearing on the petitioner's record may be
enough to prevent him from obtaining a license to practice.9 One
writer has concluded that as to borderline cases of good moral char-
acter which come before bar examining committees:
The rejection or acceptance of candidates rests upon the ever
changing composition of the character investigation committees.
The age, experience, background and degree of tolerance of each
member contributes to the ultimate decision in the questioned
application, as well as his physical and mental well being on that
day.' 0
II. PERSONAL BELIEFS AS EVINCING LACK OF GOOD
MORAL CHARACTER
Character infirmities sufficient to justify rejection of a request
for admission to the bar have been found in cases where the peti-
tioner has been convicted of violating a law because of a sincerely
and peaceably held belief that adherence to the law would be
morally wrong. The conscientious objector cases provide good
examples.
A. DENIAL OF ADMITTANCE OR DISBARMENT FOR CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTORS
The most recent case of this type is In re Brooks." During
World War II the applicant, then a resident of New York, was
classified by his draft board as a conscientious objector. He was
ordered to report for transportation to a civilian service camp but
refused to do so on grounds that performing this kind of work
would also violate the scruples of his conscience. He was convicted
for violating a federal law and served a prison sentence. The
applicant was refused entry into the Washington bar in 1959 upon
9 Application of Stover, 65 Cal. App. 622, 224 P. 771 (1924) (arrests for
alleged cheating at dice games). See Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal.
183, 294 P. 697 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930).
10 Green, Procedures for Character Investigations, 35 BAR EXAM. 10, 14
(1966).
11 57 Wash. 2d 66, 355 P.2d 840 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 813 (1961).
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a finding by the bar association's board of governors that he was not
of good moral character. In the opinion of the board the applicant's
acts had been "unjustifiably defiant of the laws of the United
States."' 2 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed. A concurring
opinion candidly admitted that "the decisional function herein is
pufrely and simply a matter of value emphasis and personal
judgment."'13
An Illinois case has held that an attorney convicted for refusing
to report for induction after his claim to conscientious objector
status was denied is morally unfit to remain a member of the bar.'
The petitioner in In re Summers,15 properly classified as a con-
scientious objector under the Selective Service Act, was rejected
for bar admission by the Illinois Supreme Court because of that
court's conclusion that he could not in good faith take the required
oath to support the state constitution, one provision of which
required service in the militia in time of war by men of the peti-
tione's age group. The decision was upheld in the United States
Supreme Court by a five-four margin. Justice Black's dissent
criticized the majority's opinion by pointing out that (1) Illinois
had not drafted men into the militia since 1864, and that (2) no
one could say that the state would not exempt men holding views
like the petitioner's should it ever activate a militia in the future.16
In 1965 Congress amended the Universal Military Training and
Service Act (successor to the Selective Service Act) to specifically
make the willful burning of draft cards a felony.17 This law has
been upheld by two federal courts of appeal against challenges
that it infringed rights protected by the first, fifth and eighth amend-
ments to the Constitution.' s A person planning to become a lawyer
12 Id. at 68, 355 P.2d at 841.
13 Id. at 70, 355 P.2d at 842.
14 In re Pontarelli, 393 Ill. 310, 66 N.E.2d 83 (1946).
15 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
16 Id. at 577.
17 "Any person... (3) who... knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates,
or in any manner changes any such certificate or any notation duly
and validly inscribed thereon... shall, upon conviction, be fined not
to exceed $10,000 or be imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both." Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12(b), 62 Stat.
622 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 462(b) (Supp. I, 1965).Is United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 911 (1967); Smith v. United States, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966).
In a 1967 draft card destruction case heard by the First Circuit Federal
Court of Appeals, that court held that § 12(b)(3) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act unconstitutionally infringes first
amendment rights. However, the court affirmed the defendant's con-
viction under § 12(b) (6) of the Act because he had violated a regula-
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would choose the draft card burning form of public protest at immi-
nent peril to his professional future as long as In re Brooks and
In re Summers remain accepted precedents.
B. HOLDING BELIEFS OF A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR NOT A BAR
TO ENTRY TO PROFESSION
Not all courts have been convinced that being a conscientious
objector permanently discolors one's moral character. In 1947 the
New York Court of Appeals held that a claim of exemption from
military service on conscientious and lawful grounds without proof
of insincerity or disloyalty was not evidence of bad moral char-
acter which would prevent an applicant from gaining admission
to the bar.19
Another New York case, although concerned with entry into
the insurance profession, is nevertheless relevant.20 In his applica-
tion for an insurance broker's license in New York, the petitioner
stated that he had been denied a conscientious objector classifica-
tion by his draft board and had subsequently been convicted for
refusing to report to an induction center. Even though the petitioner
had successfully passed an examination for the insurance broker's
license he was refused the license on grounds he was not a "trust-
worthy person" within the meaning of the state law setting out
entrance requirements. The state insurance department ruled that
the record of the petitioner's conviction showed on its face that he
was untrustworthy.
The New York Court of Appeals ordered the insurance depart-
ment to conduct a hearing as to the sincerity of the petitioner's
objections to military service before deeming him untrustworthy.
The court emphasized that the petitioner might have sincerely
held his beliefs .nd still not have been eligible for conscientious
objector status within the Selective Service Act because his views
were essentially political, sociological or philosophical rather than
religious. The court stated:
If it is determined upon evidence that the Selective Service Board
believed petitioner to be a sincere person, but one whose beliefs
did not entitle him to conscientious objector status under the con-
gressional act, then denial of his application for a license where this
is the only evidence of his untrustworthiness would be arbitrary
and capricious.21
tion promulgated pursuant to the Act requiring him to have his draft
card in his possession at all times. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d
538 (1st Cir. 1967).
19 Application of Steinbugler, 297 N.Y. 713, 77 N.E.2d 16 (1947).
20 Koster v. Holz, 3 N.Y. 2d 639, 148 N.E.2d 287, 171 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1958).
21 Id. at 648, 148 N.E.2d at 292, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 72-73.
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A few months before it handed down its Hallinan decision,
the California Supreme Court held that good faith conscientious
objectors who had pleaded guilty and served prison sentences more
than twenty years previous for violation of the Selective Service
Act had not committed an "infamous" crime within the meaning
of a California constitutional provisior prohibiting such persons
from being allowed to vote.2 2 The court rejected In re Brooks as
persuasive precedent in the case.23 This 'decision of the California
high court, coupled with its subsequent holding in Hallinan, indi-
cates that it might join New York in refusing to sanction the
exclusion of conscientious objectors from professions on character
grounds when their sincerely held beliefs have caused them to be
in peaceable violation of induction laws.
C. OTiEa BELIEFS AND CoNDucT NOT ADEQUATE TO DENY
A recent Florida case appears in accord with the Hallinan
approach of refusing to accept sincerely held and peaceably prac-
ticed social beliefs as a valid basis for excluaing persons from the
ranks of the legal profession.24 Here the respondent, a member of
both the Florida and New York bars, had been disbarred in a dis-
ciplinary proceeding in New York. Subsequiently a referee ap-
pointed by the Florida bar to conduct a heaing on the respond-
ent's case recommended that he be either disbarred or suspended.
The board of governors of the Florida bar adopted the referee's
findings and ordered the respondent disbarred.
3
In remanding the cause to the referee the Florida Supreme
Court held that he had proceeded on the erroneous assumption
that the New York judgment was binding on Florida as to both
proof of guilt and the discipline to be administered. The court
ruled that the referee was required to make an,, independent ap-
praisal of the alleged acts of misconduct. The court discovered
that the referee had also relied on the respondent'% belief and prac-
tice of existentialism as a further ground for declaring him un-
worthy for continued bar membership. Overrulin the referee in
this respect, the court stated: "Mere belief in an unorthodox philo-
sophy does not in itself make one unfit to practice law.' 2 -5
In Application of Levine26 a committee of the:,state bar of
Arizona believed the petitioner to be lacking in good-moral char-
22 Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rpti 284 (1966).
23 Id. at 612, 414 P.2d at 423, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
24 Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
25 Id. at 201.
26 97 Ariz. 88, 397 P.2d 205 (1964).
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acter and refused to recommend him for admission. It appeared
that the petitioner had worked for the F.B.I. for about eleven
months after graduating from law school and then resigned. He
sought reinstatement three weeks later but was advised by the
F.B.I.'s director, J. Edgar Hoover, that he would not be re-employed.
The bar committee gave as its reasons for not recommending the
petitioner: (1) that after he was denied reinstatement to the F.B.I.
he had written letters to congressional committees charging irregu-
larities in the manner in which the F.B.I. was operated; (2) that
he had authored an article in The Nation called "Hoover and the
Red Scare" in which he had made fictitious representations; and
(3) that he had made other derogatory charges against the F.B.I.
and its director which "were in general not true. The committee
felt that the charges tended to undermine the confidence of the
public in the F.B.I. aild it concluded that the petitioner did not
possess the sense of public responsibility which a lawyer should
have.
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the committee and
ordered the petitioner admitted to practice. It agreed that many
of the statements made by the petitioner about the F.B.I. were based
more on educated guesses than on facts. However, it held these
statements and the derogatory statements made about the F.B.I.'s
director were governed by the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan2 -- that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited even though it includes caustic and
sharp attacks on government and public officials.28
III. BAR ADMISSION DECISIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A number of bar admission cases have been adjudicated by
the United States Supreme Court in recent years. State bar exam-
ining committees considering the good moral character of applicants
and state courts reviewing decisions of these committees must
operate with a awareness of the holdings of these cases.
The Supreme Court has ruled that a person cannot be denied
admission to a state bar for reasons of lack of character or fitness
without having been given a hearing on the charges made against
him either before the committee which examined him or the court
27 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)
28 Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 97, 397 P.2d 205, 211 (1964). Another
precedent for the Arizona court's holding might have been Konigsberg
v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1957), where the Supreme Court
could not find an inference of bad moral character in vigorous edi-
torial criticism of public officials and their policies.
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which reviewed the committee's decision. Fourteenth amendment
procedural due process demands that the applicant be entitled
to confront and cross-examine those testifying adversely to his
character.
29
The Supreme Court has laid down as a test for any good moral
character qualification which a state requires of an applicant that
it have a rational connection with his fitness or capacity to practice
law.30 The Court stands ready to review the record of a bar admis-
sion case it may hear to determine whether the state's bar examin-
ing committee and the reviewing court have correctly applied the
"rational connection" test.31
Past membership in the Communist Party when it was a lawful
party of the petitioner's state, 2 arrests for alleged violation of a
state criminal syndicalism law33 or of a federal neutrality act,
34
the use of aliases to secure a job, 3 or vigorous editorial criticism of
public officials and their policies 6 have all been held to be improper
grounds for denying admission to the bar because of lack of good
moral character.
29 Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
30 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
31 This is exactly what the Court did in Schware v. Board of Bar Exam-
iners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) and Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252
(1957). See Kalven & Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished
Debate Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 LAW IN TRANS.
155, 162, 171 (1961); Cronin, The Subversive Applicant, 32 BAR EXAM.
84, 86 (1963).
The Court has perhaps encouraged state appellate courts to do a
more thorough and critical job of reviewing the records of bar exam-
ining committee decisions; e.g., Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Exam-
iners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966);
Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965).
32 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244-46 (1957);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 268 (1957).
The Oregon Supreme Court held in 1963 that the applicant's active
membership in the Communist Party from 1949 to 1957, his failure to
disclose that fact in an application for work as a longshoreman in
1953, and his failure to disclose his past Party affliation in his applica-
tion for admittance to law school after he left the Party were not
sufficient to deny the applicant admission to the Oregon bar when
he stated and produced evidence showing he had quit the Party and,
primarily, because three highly respected members of the Oregon
bar attested to his present good moral character. In re Application
of Jolles, 235 Ore. 262, 383 P.2d 388 (1963).
83 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 241-42 (1957).
34 Id. at 242-43.
35 Id. at 240-41.
36 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1957).
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The Supreme Court has, however, held that admission to the
bar may validly be withheld from an applicant for refusal to answer
examining committee questions as to whether he is a present or
former member of the Ccjrnmunist Party.37 Advocating violent
overthrow of the government is an accepted reason for excluding
persons from the bar.38 AA examining committee may require an
applicant to state whethet he is a present or former member of
the Communist Party because such information might open up a
line of questioning the Mswers to which would show that the
applicant actually does believe in violent overthrow although he
may otherwise deny it.39"
In Spevack v. Klein,) a case handed down in 1967, the Supreme
Court held that an attoioey could not be disbarred for invoking his
constitutional privilege'against self-incrimination as a reason for
refusing to comply with a state court subpoena ordering him to
produce records pertairing to contingent fee cases he had handled.
In overruling Cohen v., Hurley,41 the Court concluded that:
ITihe Self-Incrimin ion Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been
absorbed in the Fou eenth, . . it extends its protection to lawyers
37 Konigsberg v. Stati Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82 (1961).
38 Application of Cyisidy, 296 N.Y. 926, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 6061 (West 1962).
39 Konigsberg v. StAe Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 46-47, 51-52 (1961); In re Anas-
taplo, 366 U.S. 821,89-90 (1961).
The Supreme Court has not held that an admittance of present or
former membersiip in the Communist Party would be sufficient by
itself to keep aAapplicant out of the bar. It has held only that failure
to answer queEbns as to present or past membership is enough to
prevent admitlfce because such failure obstructs bar examining
committees in ,teir proper functions of interrogating and cross-exam-
ining candidafo about their qualifications. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S.
82, 88 (1961). Phe Court's reasoning could apply as well to bar com-
mittee questi6ts regarding, for example, an applicant's affliation with
another politilal party.
A state oF federal statute (or a rule passed by a bar committee
directly or ibdirectly provided for by statute) which made Commu-
nist Party nembership alone grounds for exclusion from the bar
might very well run into the constitutional infirmity of a bill of
attainder. .S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10, prohibits the federal govern-
ment andihe states, respectively, from passing bills of attainder. In
United St*tes v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the Supreme Court struck
down as .F bill of attainder a federal statute which made it a crime
for a pe-on to serve as an officer or as an employee (other than in
a mino icapacity) of a labor union if he was presently a member of
the Co unist Party or had been a member within the previous five
years. ee also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
40 385 U . 511 (1967).
41 366 US. 117 (1961).
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as well as to other individuals, and,... it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation
of a livelihood as a price for assertingit.42
'A
It is uncertain whether Spevack -will reach into the area of
bar admission cases. In a dissenting Qpinion, Justice Harlan ex-
presses a belief that it may.43 If this proxes to be true then Konigs-
berg 114 and In re Anastaplo45 (cases in Which the Court held that
a state could deny bar admission to persons refusing to say whether
or not they were present or former meibers of the Communist
Party) are in serious jeopardy, because the-petitioners in those cases
raised constitutional issues other than the right against self-incrimi-
nation.46
But Spevack was a five-four decision an.d the concurring opinion
of Justice Fortas must be taken into consideration. Iri the proceed-
ings below in Spevack, the New York Court-,f Appeals had affirmed
the petitioner's disbarment on the strength I2, in addition to Cohen
v. Hurley, the required records doctrine of Shapiro v. United
States.47 Shapiro concerned a federal price 'control regulation re-
quiring merchants to keep sales records. Tl. Supreme Court had
considered these to be records with public apects and concluded
that their compelled production did not viol-te the fifth amend-
ment. In Spevack the Court refused to reach the Shapiro doctrine
on grounds it was improperly presented. Justide Fortas agreed that
the issue was not appropriately presented. tHowever, he stated
how he probably would have voted had the ,ue been correctly
raised:
If this case presented the question whether a lavar might be dis-
barred for refusal to keep or produce, upon proerly authorized
and particularized demand, records which the 4,.Vyer was law-
fully and properly required to keep by the State s a proper part
of its functions in relation to him as licensor in Jis high calling,
I should feel compelled to vote to affirm, althoughT would be pre-
pared in an appropriate case to re-examine the sccpe of the prin-
42 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967).
43 Id. at 521 (Harlan, J., dissenting opinion). Q
44 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
45 366 U.S. 82 (1961) j746 In Konigsberg 11, the petitioner argued that the com.ittee's inquiry
infringed his first amendment rights of free thoughtassociation and
expression, as enforced upon the states by the fourteeifh amendment,
and that the state's action in denying him membership 4 or refusing to
answer was arbitrary and prohibited by the fourteenf1, amendment.
The petitioner in In re Anastaplo raised similar constitional points,
and the additional one that the examining committee '1d deprived
him of his right to be warned in advance of the conseqnces of his
refusal to answer.
47 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
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ciple announced in Shapiro v. United States .... I am not prepared
to indicate doubt as to the essential validity of Shapiro.4 s
Hence even present members of the bar cannot yet be sure of
absolute protection from disbarment when they invoke the right
against self-incrimination as grounds for refusing to answer offi-
cial inquiries. Should the "records with public aspects" issue be
squarely presented to the Supreme Court in a future disbarment
case, the views of Justice Fortas may carry the day. And the Court
probably can preserve Konigsberg II and In re Anastaplo by hold-
ing that a state may "lawfully and properly" inquire into the
present Communist Party membership of a person seeking admis-
sion to its bar "as a proper part of its functions in relation to him
as [a future] licensor."
IV. VULNERABILITY OF PRESENT MEMBERS OF THE BAR
TO DISMISSAL FOR ACTS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The petitioner in fallinan hinted that he might feel justified
in sometimes violating laws to further civil rights causes after he
became a member of the bar.49 Assuming the profession might
forgive an applicant for breaking laws in behalf of civil rights before
he becomes a lawyer,'could it tolerate such behavior from a member
in good standing-or would he be subject to disbarment?
A lawyer should consider the statutory grounds for disbarment
in his state. Many:states make disbarment mandatory upon con-
viction of any felony 50 while others provide for disbarment upon
conviction of a felcny or a misdemeanor if either involves "moral
turpitude."51 There are a few state statutes, apparently aimed at
controlling civil rights demonstrations, the breach of which would
be a felony. 52 If an attorney was convicted of violating one of
48 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring
opinion)
49 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447,
458-59, 421 Pd 76, 84-85, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 236-37 (1966).
50 N.Y. JuDicIARY LAW § 90.4 (McKinney 1948); ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 49
(1958) (maslaughter excepted); Miss. CODE ANN. § 8667 (1956)(manslaughter excepted); Comment, Disbarment: Non-Professional
Conduct Dmnonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 CORNELL L. Q. 489,490-91 (10958).
51 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.190(1) (1952); GA. CODE ANN. § 9.501 (1936);
43 CoRNLuL L. Q., note 50 supra at 490-91.
52 The following Louisiana statute was enacted in 1960: "Whoever with
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or under circumstances such
that a ,breach of the peace may be occasioned thereby... (4) refuses
to leave the premises of another when requested to do so by any
ownei; lessee, or any employee thereof, shall be guilty of aggravated
battery, provided such conduct shall lead to a breach of the peace or
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these statutes and its constitutionality was sustained, he would
be subject to being dismissed from his profession in a state where
conviction of a felony means automatic disbarment. If he happened
to be a member of the bar in a state other than the one in which
he was convicted, it is possible that a bar committee or court of
the state where he held membership would not recognize the felony
conviction of the other state as cause for disbarment.
Even though an attorney is convicted only of a misdemeanor
while engaging in acts of civil disobedience, he may be disbarred if
the misdemeanor is found to have involved "moral turpitude." Defi-
nitions of moral turpitude range from acts "of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to
his fellow men, or to society in general,153 to conduct on the part
of an attorney "which is contrary to justice, honesty, and good
morals."5 4 Justice Jackson called the term "an undefined and
undefinable standard."55
The Hallinan court could not find moral turpitude in the misde-
meanors (e.g., disturbing the peace, unlawful assembly, trespass)
committed by the petitioner there, considering the circumstances in
which they were committed. Whether other courts or bar discipli-
nary committees would so rule, particularly in the case of a duly
admitted attorney, is open to speculation. A decision might turn
on whether the attorney acted peaceably and in good faith after
traditional means of alleviating a particular civil rights problem
had been exhausted without success. The disciplinary committee
or court might give weight to the number of times the attorney
had been arrested and convicted for taking part in demonstrations
and whether he had gained public notoriety as a consequence. Dis-
barment or suspension have been ordered in the past for attorneys
whose behavior created an unfavorable public image.56
incite a riot in any of the places herein named, and as a result of
said breach of the peace or riot another person or persons shall be
maimed, killed or injured.
B. Whoever commits an aggravated battery as defined herein shall
be imprisoned for not more than ten years." LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14.34.1 (Supp. 1966). See Miss. CODE ANN. § 2087.9 (Supp. 1964).
53 BLAci's LAw DIc~roNARY 1160 (4th ed. 1951).
54 Noland v. State Bar, 63 Cal. 2d 298, 302, 405 P.2d 129, 131, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 305, 307 (1965).
55 Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 235 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting
opinion).
56 Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 152 A. 292 (1930)
(disbarment ordered for attorney convicted of adultery with wife
of war hero); Matter of Welansky, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E.2d 202 (1946)
(disbarment affirmed for attorney convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter in connection with loss of lives in nightclub fire); State v.
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The lawyer must also keep in mind, canons 29 and 32 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics, a violation of which may be grounds
for his suspension or disbarment. Canon 29 commands the lawyer
to "strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dig-
nity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice." Canon 32 states in relevant part:
[The lawyer] advances the honor of his profession and the best
interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tend-
ing to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance
with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe
and advise his client to observe the statute law, though until a
statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity
and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning
and extent.
These two canons contain their share of ambiguities. As to
Canon 29, one could argue that a lawyer is not upholding the honor
and dignity of his profession when he breaks laws in behalf of
civil rights. The lawyer who so acts could counter that he is
actually striving "to improve...the law." Canon 32 urges the
lawyer to advise his client to comply with "principles of moral
law." Does this mean a lawyer may advise his client (and simi-
larly "advise" himself) to risk being convicted of violating a sta-
tute or ordinance if he believes a higher law will be obeyed by so
doing? Also in Canon 32, the lawyer is warned to observe and
to advise his client to observe the statute law, except that until
"competent adjudication" has interpreted and construed the statute
he may advise his client to act (and probably may act himself)
according to what he believes the statute means and whether he
considers it to be valid.
One writer concludes that under Canon 32 "a lawyer can and
indeed sometimes would be required to counsel his client not to
obey a particular statute because the lawyer 'conscientiously'
doubted its 'validity' and because, moreover, compliance with such
a statute might be contrary to the 'strictest principles of the moral
law.' "57 Other writers, not directly concerned with interpreting
Canon 32, suggest that those who have a good faith belief that a
law is being improperly applied to thwart legitimate civil rights
goals may peaceably resist the law until courts have "finally and
definitively" ruled that the law is being validly applied. After such
Ablah, 348 P.2d 172 (Okla. 1959) (suspension affirmed for attorney
who made anonymous and annoying phone calls to doctor's office).
57 Drinan, Changing Role of the Lawyer in an Era of Non-Violent Action,
1 LAW IN TRAws. Q. 123, 125-26 (1964).
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a ruling, continued resistance is no longer justified. s However,
another writer maintains that a final court ruling upholding the
law being protested against should not necessarily signal the end
to further protest against it. He comments that such a position
"would freeze as permanent law the Dred Scott, Plessy, Macintosh,
and countless other decisions, which have since been reversed. 59
There do not appear to be any court cases interpreting a lawyer's
obligations under Canons 29 and 32 in the civil rights area.
V. THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS A RIGHT
RATHER THAN A PRIVILEGE
Courts have customarily called the practice of law a "privilege"
rather than a "right." The former term has often been used in dis-
barment" and bar admission6 cases as an important theoretical
justification for excluding from bar membership those whose behav-
ior deviates from the norm. The sanction of dismissal, or refusal
to grant entry, is in addition to any criminal punishment the per-
son may have received for violating a law. Certain of the con-
scientious objector cases, reviewed supra, are examples of this dual
form of penalty.
Recently, however, courts have begun to view the legal practi-
tioner's status as a right rather than a privilege. Translated into
concrete effect, this seems to mean a recognition that a lawyer
usually has built up a valuable property interest through years of
effort, and that this interest should not be taken from him except
for very serious reasons. Assertion of a constitutional right osten-
sibly available to all citizens alike, or holding a philosophical belief
not shared by a majority of one's professional brethren, have been
held not adequate to justify dismissal from the bar. In disallowing
disbarment as a penalty for a lawyer who sought his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court pointed out
that "[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional stand-
ing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
58 Tweed, Segal & Packer, Civil Rights and Disobedience to Law: A
Lawyer's View, 36 N.Y. ST. B. J. 290, 294 (1964). The authors do not
say which court should be the one to "finally and definitively" rule
on such a law, but ostensibly it would be the highest court to which
an appeal as to the law's validity is carried.
59 Freeman, The Right of Protest and Civil Disobedience, 41 IND. L. J.
228, 237 (1966).
60 State v. Bieber, 121 Kan. 536, 538-39, 247 P. 875, 876 (1926); Note,
Character Investigation and Admission to the Bar, 20 U. PiTT. L. REV.
841, 843 (1959).
61 In re Stephenson, 243 Ala. 342, 347, 10 So. 2d 1, 5 (1942); O'Brien's
Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 55, 63 A. 777, 780 (1906).
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compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. ' 62 Belief
and practice of existentialism, standing alone, struck the Florida
Supreme Court as a frivolous and unsubstantial ground for recom-
mending disbarment.6 3
The privilege concept is also crumbling in the area of admis-
sions to the bar, where it might be thought to have a stronger
foundation in that the applicant for admission has not made the
same monetary and time investments as has the established practi-
tioner. True, he has not made equivalent investments but never-
theless he has put in "considerable time, energy and expense in
obtaining a legal education."64 With this reality in mind some
courts have moved to accord to a law graduate who has met the
state's legal knowledge requisites a "right" to be admitted to the
profession. 5 This shift in terminology probably means that review-
ing courts will take a more critical look at appeals from bar exam-
ining committee decisions which have denied persons admission
because of a finding of infirmities in their moral character. An
applicant's peaceably held, good faith disagreement with the social,
political or religious views of a then current majority of the public
may not in the future subject him to the stigma of bad moral char-
acter and prevent his entrance into the legal profession.
The opinions of Justice Black, expressed in bar admission and
disbarment cases heard by the Supreme Court during the last
decade, have been influential in causing courts to turn away from
the traditional view that the practice of law is only a privilege.
His thoughts on the subject are perhaps most fully stated in his
dissenting opinion in Cohen v. Hurley.6" There he argues that a
lawyer's abilities, and his practice with its accompanying goodwill,
are capital assets. In criticizing the majority's decision that a lawyer
could be disbarred for invoking the constitutional privilege against
62 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967). See also Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), where the Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of police officers who were found guilty of conspiracy to
obstruct the administration of traffic laws on the basis of answers
they gave to questions of an investigation conducted by the state
attorney general. The police officers were confronted by a state
statute which provided that if they invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination in such an inquiry they forfeited their jobs. TheCourt emphasized that: "The option to lose their means of livelihood
or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or remain silent." Id. at 497.
63 Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 200-01 (Fla. 1965).
64 Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447,
452, 421 P.2d 76, 80, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 n. 3 (1966).
65 Id.; Application of Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 90, 397 P.2d 205, 206-07 (1964).
66 366 U.S. 117 (1961).
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self-incrimination (a decision since overruled by Spevack v. Klein,
supra) he stated, "[t]he theory that the practice of law is noth-
ing more than a privilege conferred by the State which it can
destroy whenever it can assert a 'reasonable' justification for doing
so seems to me to permit plain confiscation."87 The Spevack major-
ity seems to have adopted Black's views that the practice of law
is a valuable property right.8 " Black has also emphasized that the
economic investment which a person studying to become a lawyer
is required to make deserves consideration in bar admission cases. 69
Another source of influence on courts deciding disbarment and
bar admission cases has been Professor Reich's article, "The New
Property. '70 This is an exhaustive and thoughtful study of the
ever-expanding occupational and professional licensing system
which is administered through governmental or quasi-governmental
agencies. The author urges that "[t]hose forms of [government]
largess which are closely linked to status must be deemed to be
held as of right.... The presumption should be that the profes-
sional man will keep his license, and the welfare recipient his pen-
sion. These interests should be 'vested.'"71
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hallinan decision appears to break new ground in holding
that a person who participates in acts of civil disobedience peaceably
and with a good faith belief that he is helping to achieve legitimate
civil rights goals does not thereby close the door to his future hopes
of becoming a lawyer. The case implies that a present member of
the bar who engages in similar activity would not be dismissed
for lack of good moral character.
The petitioner's acts of civil disobedience were held by the
Hallinan court not to involve "moral turpitude." Whether the per-
son has committed acts of "moral turpitude" is a common standard
laid down in statutes and bar committee rules, to be applied in
deciding admission and disbarment cases. This is a sufficiently
broad standard to allow bar examining or disciplinary committees
or reviewing courts in other states to follow the Hallinan reasoning
67 Id. at 146-47 (Black, J., dissenting opinion).
6s 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967).
69 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 73-74 (1961) (Black, J., dissent-
ing opinion)
70 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964). The Hallinan
court cites the article. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners of
State Bar, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452, 421 P.2d 76, 80, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 n. 3
(1966)
71 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733, 785 (1964).
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should a case with similar facts come before them. Whatever
approach they take, bar committees and reviewing courts must
keep in mind the test enunciated by the Supreme Court when
determining whether the person's conduct involved moral turpi-
tude and thus stamped his character with an infirmity sufficient
to prevent his admission or require his removal from the bar-the
basis of the committee's or the court's decision must have some
rational connection with the person's fitness to practice law.
Deliberate acts of violence in purported support of a social
cause doubtlessly will not be tolerated by bar committees and
reviewing courts from a present or prospective member of the
bar. But the credentials of a lawyer need not necessarily be denied
to one who sincerely and peaceably participates in an act of civil
disobedience after it becomes apparent that normal methods of
petitioning for improvement through established private or govern-
ment channels have proved useless.
William B. Fenton, '68
